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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

I
i

I

PLATEAU URANIUM INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

>Ca~; 7~o.

vs.
SUGAR AND ULMER, a partnership,
and PAUL SUGAR and HARRY ULMER
'
Defendants and Appellants.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts
submitted by Appellants. The statement is incomplete and not
objective. However, since the argument of Point One requires
a complete review of the evidence, no attempt will be made
by the Respondent to state the particular points of disagreement.
3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE: THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPELLANTS
AGREED TO PAY A RETAINER OF $500, PLUS COSTS.
POINT TWO: THE OBLIGATION OF THE APPELLANTS WAS NOT DISCHARGED BY VIRTUE OF TITLE
15-4, U.C.A. 1953.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPELLANTS
AGREED TO PAY A RETAINER OF $500, PLUS COSTS.
Finding of Fact Number 2, which the Appellant claims is
not supported by the evidence, is as follows:
"On April 12, 1955, the defendants (Appellants)
agreed to pay the plaintiff's assignor (Respondent) the
sum of $500 and costs on a fee to be charged for services
performed in connection with the organizing of Deseret
Uranium Corporation and clearance with State and
Federal regulatory bodies, for the purpose of permitting a public sale of stock of said company."
The only factual issue for the court to decide was whether
there was or was not an agreement as found in the Findings
of Fact. The trial took less than two hours and involved the
testimony of three witnesses. It is submitted that the evidence
is not only sufficient to sustain the Findings of Fact, but rather
compels such a finding.
4
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Although the parties disagree as to whether the Appellants
were personally liable on the first fee arrangement, there is
no dispute but what Mr. Bushnell performed all of the legal
work originally agreed upon and was not paid. After that
time, he was again requested to prepare a new offering circular
and to make new filings with State and Federal regulatory
bodies for the purpose of securing authorization to commence
a public sale of stock. Discussions concerning the first fee
arrangement were had with Mr. Sugar. Although there was a
preliminary discussion sometime prior to March 19, 1955,
the final fee arrangement was consummated with Mr. Ulmer
during the first part of April, 1955 (R. 16, 22). There is no
dispute concerning the fact that the Appellants advanced $175
to apply on costs in connection with the initial work (R. 8).
There is also no dispute that if the underwriting had been
successful the Appellaf!tS would have been the principal
parties to benefit therefrom. They readily admitted that they
would have received a substantial profit involving cash, royalties and stock (R. 11, 12, 42).
Mr. Bushnell testified in behalf of the Respondent to
the effect that before agreeing to make the refilings a new fee
arrangement was negotiated. More particularly, the Appellants
agreed to pay all costs and advance a $500 retainer. A contingent fee of $3,000 cash and $3,000 stock was to be paid by the
corporation if the underwritings were successful. If the corporation paid such a fee, Mr. Bushnell would then reimburse
the Appellants for the sums advanced by them. Whether such
an agreement was made was the sole factual issue for the trial
court. The testimony of the Appellants is sufficient to support
5
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a finding that such an agreement was made, without relying
upon the direct testimony of Mr. Bushnell.
Paul Sugar, one of the Appellants, called as an adverse
witness, testified that he went to the hospital with a heart
attack on March 19, 1955 (R. 45), and that Mr. Ulmer continued with the negotiations and arrangements for the refiling.
He admitted that either while he was at the hospital or immediately thereafter while convalescing, Mr. Ulmer had a
discussion with him concerning a demand made by Mr. Bushnell
for the $500 retainer plus costs (R. 46). It should be noted
that it is the contention of Mr. Bushnell that the fee arrangement was finally agreed upon on April 12, 1955; that the final
papers and material were submitted to him in May of 1955;
that the filing was made with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in June, and final approval was secured therefrom
on July 8, 1955. Part of Mr. Sugar's testimony concerning the
$500 retainer is as follows:
" (Questions by Mr. Bushnell)
Answer: Well, he also said that you said, at that time,
that I would give him five-give you $500 towards this
fee at that time; this I didn't tell you.
Question: See if we understana what you are saying;
Mr. Ulmer said to you that I was taking the position
that Sugar and Ulmer was to pay me a $500 retainerAnswer: Yes.
Question: -is that correct?
Answer: No; no, that you and I had made that arrangement.
Question: That is what he told you?
Answer: That is correct." (R. 17).
6
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Mr. Sugar admitted that he had testified as follows at the
time of the taking of his deposition:
"Answer: That came up later when Harry Ulmer told
me you were asking for $500 as the advance retainer,
and that was the first time I had heard of it.
Question: When did Harry Ulmer advise you of that?
Answer: I don't recall that with reference to the work
being done, before or after it was done, or after the
work had been started. Anyway, I don't know if it
had been completed.
Question: All right, what did he tell you about the
$500?
Answer: He said you were looking for $500 fee-a
$500 advance on the fee, and you didn't want to go
ahead, and I said, ·you tell him to go ahead and do
that work.' " (R. 18).
On cross-examination, Mr. Sugar testified concerning the
same matter as follows:
"Question: And you have testified, have you not, that
Mr. Ulmer told you, either when you were in the hospital or when you were convalescing, that I was making
demand for $500 retainer before I would go ahead.
Didn't he tell you that?
Answer: Yes.
Question: And you testified that you told Mr. Ulmer to
go ahead, did you not?
Answer: Yes, because-but, in line with the same
thing, I attempted before to make out exactly what I
did say to go ahead, it being understood you knew
what-." (R. 46).
Although Mr. Sugar attempted to qualify the foregoing
7
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statements, he had to admit that he had made no such attempted
qualification at the time of the taking of his deposition.
Although Mr. Ulmer admitted that he was not involved
in any discussions regarding the initial fee arrangement and
that he did participate actively with reference to the refiling
with the second group of properties, (R. 20) he testified that
he did know of a discussion concerning a $500 fee. His testimony was as follows:
"Answer: Well, now, I don't know whether Mr. Sugar
told me, or I got that information from elsewhere, but,
as I remember, the original fee was to be in the neighborhood of $500. * * * (R. 22).
Question: But you do recall discussions concerning the
$500 fee-that that feeAnswer: Not discussions; possibly, just mere statements.
Question: You do have in your recollectionAnswer: Yes.
Question :-that there was, at some time, a fee of $500
discussed.
Answer: That's correct, yes.
Question: And who was to pay that $500 fee, according
to your understanding?
Answer: As I remember, we were going to advance
the money-Sugar and Ulmer.
Question: Do I understand your testimony correctly
that, as to the $500, it is your recollection that Sugar
and Ulmer was to pay that amount?
Answer: Yes." (R. 23).
8
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Mr. Bushnell testified that he made a demand upon Mr.
Sugar and Mr. Ulmer for the $500 retainer in a telephone
conversation in which he talked to both Mr. Sugar and Mr.
Ulmer. He testified that the conversation in substance was as
follows:
"He (Sugar) said, 'Son, what is it you want?' I said, I
want my $500 and costs.' He said, 'If that is all you
are worried about, don't worry about it; we will take
care of it.' He said, 'I have got to go and get to the
airport. I will miss my plane."
Sugar, on direct examination by his counsel, admitted
such a call. He testified as follows:
"Answer: Yes, Mr. Bushnell and Mr. Ulmer, I think,
my memory is hazy on that.
Question: At least you had a conversation with him
about the fees, shortly after you came back to the office
after your illness?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Can you recall what the substance of that
was?
Answer: I don't recall.
Question: Was a fee arrangement involved in the conversation in any way that you recall?
Answer: No, it was something about the $500, but I
don't recall the conversation.
Question: And was Mr. Ulmer present at that time?
Answer: I think so, either present or might have been
three-way telephone conversation, or in the office.
Truthfully, my memory is a little hazy on that." (R.

41).
9
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The foregoing testimony and admissions by the Appellants
would appear sufficient to support the position of the Respondent. However, in addition to those admissions, there is
the direct testimony of Mr. Bushnell, based upon a written
memorandum in his file, as follows:
"That would be 1955. Mr. Sugar told me, 'Well, I will
see what I can work out getting these properties, and
we will have further discussions.'
"Thereafter, I was advised by Mr. Ulmer that Mr.
Sugar had become ill, and had gone to the hospital,
and that he would take over working out these arrangements; and I procured from Mr. Ulmer properties,
abstracts, geological reports, maps-usual information
that goes into offering circulars.
"However, I advised Mr. Ulmer-and my thoughtbest recollection on that-would be some few days
before April 12, 1955; that, if they wanted me to release them from personal liability, that I would be
willing to take this case, as I had other cases, on, in
essence, a contingent fee basis.
"I explained, many of these companies had never been
successful, and it was problematical whether they
would receive the money, and I had to work on percentage, that I would be willing to take the case on a
fee of $3,000 cash and $3,000 worth of stock, and a
$500 retainer, which would have to be paid in advance,
plus costs.

"If they paid the $500 retainer and costs, then I wo~d
relieve them from personal liability, which I was clauning as to the $1,250, and look to the company for payment if it were successful.
"He said, 'Well, this is new to me; I will have to discuss it with Mr. Sugar, and I will let you know.'
10
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"A day or two later, he called back, and the exact
date was April 12 at 3:50 in the afternoon, and advised
that-and stated that he had talked to Mr. Sugar, and
that the fee was satisfactory. With reference to that
telephone conversation, which was taken by a stenographer in my office, I made the notation as to the fee
which we discussed, which was $3,000 cash, $3,000
stock, if the underwriting were successful, and a $500
down payment as a retainer, plus costs, and filed that
memorandum in the file." (R. 29).
Having in mind the fundamental rule that, on appeal
from factual issues, the evidence will be reviewed in the light
most favorable to the Respondent and if there is any substantial competent evidence to support the finding of the trial
court, such finding will be affirmed, it is submitted that the
foregoing evidence is more than ample to justify on affirmance
of the decision of the trial court on this factual issue.

POINT TWO: THE OBLIGATION OF THE APPELLANTS WAS NOT DISCHARGED BY VIRTUE OF TITLE
15-4, U.C.A. 1953.
The Appellants maintain that the claim of the Respondent
is barred by reason of Title 15-4, U.C.A., 1953, which provides
that if a joint obligor is released from liability and a reservation
of rights against other joint obligors is not contained in that
release, then all parties are released and discharged. The Respondent does not argue with the law cited by the Appellants
based upon that particular statutory provision. However, it is
submitted that there was no release of a joint obligor which
would bring into operation the terms of this statute. A release
is a contract by the terms of which one party, for a good and
11
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valuable consideration, releases and discharges rights of another
party. There is no document purporting to be a release, nor
is there any agreement or consideration which would support
such a contention. Rather, the only thing relied upon by the
Appellants in support of their contention is the fact that the
Respondent voluntarily reduced the amount of its claim against
the corporation by $700. Counsel for the Appellants, also
representing Deseret Uranium Corporation, had stipulated
that the Respondent could secure judgment against the corporation. At this time a decision by a City Judge in the identical
matter now before this court was under advisement. Counsel
for the Appellant was arguing that the securing of a judgment
against the corporation for the full claim would prohibit the
Respondent from securing a judgment against the Appellants
for part of the same claim. To eliminate any substance to
such a contention, and since the corporation was insolvent, the
Respondent voluntarily reduced the amount of its requested
claim by $700. Such a reduction does not amount to a contract
or a release, and was not supported by a consideration.
The annotation cited by the Appellants in their brief in 50
A.L.R. 105 7 is entitled "Release of one tort-feasor as affecting
liability of others." Although the annotation is dealing with
release of tort feasors and the case now before the court is
dealing with joint obligors pursuant to a contract, it is submitted that what amounts to a release would be the same in
both cases. One of the subparagraphs of the annotation is as
follows: "Dismissal or entry of nolle prosequi as to part."
The general statement of the la\v under this subdivision is as
follows:
12
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"The discontinuance, as to one tort-feasor, of an action
brought against several tort-feasors, does not release
the others." (Citation of authorities.)
The annotation is supplemented in 66 A.L.R. 206, 104
A.L.R. 846, 124 A.L.R. 1298, and 148 A.L.R. 1270. In each of
the subsequent annotations the general rule is stated to the
same effect. Excerpts from some of those supplemental annotations are as follows:
104 A.L.R. 860.
"VI. Dismissal or entry of nolle prosequi as to part.
(Supplementing annotations in 50 A.L.R. 1091 and
66 A.L.R. 213).
Neither a dismissal of a claim as against one or two
joint tort-feasors, for conversion, nor even a settlement made with one of them, was held to effect a
release of another, in Day v. Smith ( 1934) 46 Wyo.
515, 30 P. 2d 786.
In overruling the contention that the trial court's dismissal of a suit, as to a defendant who had obtained
a covenant not to sue, thereby gave the agreement the
effect of a release so as to discharge another defendant,
who did not appeal therefrom, the court in Cook v.
City Transport Corp. ( 1935) 272 Mich. 91, 261 N.W.
257, supra, IV., observed that plaintiff had a right to
elect whom he would sue and to dismiss as to a defendant, and that he could accept the court's ruling as
the equivalent of a voluntary dismissal by himself,
which would not have discharged the other defendant;
and it also stated that the dismissal did not change the
other defendant's liability."
124 A.L.R. 1315.
"VI. Dismissal or entry of nolle prosequi as to part.
(Supplementing annotations in 50 A.L.R. 1091; 66
A.L.R. 213; and 104 A.L.R. 860).
13
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The general rule appears to be, as shown by the earlier
annotations, that the discontinuance, as to one tortfeasor, of an action brought against several tort-feasors,
does not release the others.
In Shea v. San Bernardino ( 1936) 7 Cal. 2d 688, 62
P. 2d 365, the court said: 'The discontinuance, as to
one tort-feasor, of an action brought against several
tort-feasors, no satisfaction having been received, does
not release the others.' In that case plaintiff brought
suit against a railway company and city, for damages
sustained while driving over a rough railway crossing,
and it was held that plaintiff's dismissal of the action
as to the railway company did not release the city,
where there was no showing that any satisfaction was
received by plaintiff for the injury.
Plaintiff's dismissal of the cause of action as to the
two joint tort-feasors, effectuated by voluntarily asking the clerk to enter such dismissal, in pursuance of
a settlement and covenant not to sue, was held not
to release other joint tort-feasors, in Lewis V. Johnson,
(1939) 12 Cal. 2d 558, 86 P. 2d 99, set out more fully
supra, IV a, wherein the court distinguished between
such a voluntary dismissal by clerk's entry,' which
is presumed to be without prejudice to the bringing
of another action, and a dismissal entered in open court
pursuant to stipulation, which is ordinarily effective as
a retraxit.' "

If the Respondent in this case could have dismissed the
entire action as against the corporation and the same would
not have been construed as a release of any liability, it is submitted that the Respondent may, in its discretion, waive a
part of the claim against the corporation. The quotations
from the annotations clearly state that the plaintiff may dismiss
as to one joint tort-feasor or may even grant a covenant not
14
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to sue, and such action does not amount to a release which
will bar recovery against other joint tort-feasors. It is manifest,
therefore, that a dismissal or a waiver against one joint tortfeasor or joint obligor does not amount to a release of liability.
The complete argument of the Appellants is based up the assumption that there had been a release of liability by the
Respondent. The evidence does not support such a contention.
Even if it could be construed that a release had been granted,
it is further submitted that the Appellants would be estopped
to rely upon any benefits in their favor based thereon. The
reduction in the amount of the claim against the corporation
was made as a result of complaints and arguments then being
made by the Appellants that the securing of a judgment against
both the corporation and the individual appelfants would be
tantamount to double payment. Although it is submitted that
the securing of judgments without satisfaction is not double
payment, it would still be inequitable for the appellants to
now contend that the Respondent by voluntarily reducing the
amount of his claim against the insolvent corporation has
released the individual Appellants from any liability.
The only case cited by the Appellant in support of its
contention with reference to the release was a Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, Greenhalch vs. Shell Oil Company,
78 F. 2d 942. This case involved a document entitled "Release
and Stipulation for Dismissal." It was clear that the document
was a release granted in payment of a substantial consideration,
and further the document, after releasing and discharging the
liability of the one party, specifically reserved rights as against
a doctor for malpractice. It did not reserve its rights as against
the defendant in the particular case. The court, therefore,

15
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held that the document was what it purported to be, a release
and a stipulation for dismissal. In this case there was no contract, payment of consideration, or document purporting or intended to be a release or dismissal of any claims.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that there is substantial competent evidence
to support the factual determination of the trial court that the
Appellants individually agreed to pay a $500 retainer and costs.
Further, it is submitted that there was no release granted to
a co-obligor which would, therefore, bring into operation the
terms of the statute cited by the Appellants. It is respectfully
submitted that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed,
with costs to the Respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH & BUSHNELL and
ELWOOD A. CRANDALL

Attorneys for Respondent
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City 11, Utah

By Elwood A. Crandall

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NAUJOKS v.
The following articles discuss recent
trends in products liability

cases~

21 NACCA Law J ourna 1 85, 419; 20 NACCA Law

Journal 291; 4 Defense Journal 56; 2 Harper
& James. The Law of Torts, page 1534 et

seq~

and particularly page 1555 § 28.10 which

clearly shows that any acts on the part of
Suhrmann would not be considered an inter-

vening act breaking the proximate cause
between defendants' negligence and breach
of warranty and plaintiffs' injuries.
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